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This report examines the motivations, operations, and collaboration methods of China’s 
development assistance policy and programming. A central focus of the report is Chinese 
development assistance in what the International Development Research Centre calls research 
for development. Research for development is the use of science and technology to reduce 
poverty in developing countries through practical, long-term solutions to social, economic, and 
environmental problems. In addition to support for research activities, development research also 
includes support directed toward developing research capacity within developing countries to 
introduce and sustain policies and technologies needed to build healthier, more equitable, and 
more prosperous societies. 
 
Research indicates that the landscape of official development assistance is changing, as 
emerging donors become significant actors in providing support to developing countries. 
Differences of opinion exist over whether or not aid from emerging donors undercuts the position 
of the traditional donor community and its emphasis on good governance, environmental 
assessment, and poverty reduction. China’s international development assistance, in particular, 
has received increasing attention over the past three years. 
 
Fresh evidence gathered from field studies suggests that the total amount of Chinese aid has 
increased significantly during the past three years and will likely increase further, barring major 
unforeseen changes in the Chinese economy. While China’s foreign aid is directed primarily 
toward large-scale infrastructure projects, energy facilities, and commercial cooperation, new 
emphasis is being given to supporting institutional capacity building and human resource 
development. 
 
Recent shifts in the country’s policy environment appear conducive for foreign donors and aid 
organizations to build new strategic partnerships with China in development assistance and 
research for development. In fact, the Chinese government has made sizeable new aid 
commitments and it may experience challenges in meeting them unless changes are made to the 
country’s current approach. Indeed, although the country’s recent efforts to support research for 
development are viewed favourably by Chinese authorities, room exists to strengthen the 
institutional infrastructure that supports such international cooperation to ensure long-term 
sustainability and engagement. 
 
This report begins by highlighting the evolution of China’s foreign aid programming. In many 
respects, current programs stem from the “Eight Principles for China’s Aid to Third World 
Countries” announced by former Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964. Chinese authorities have tended to 
focus on projects that achieve maximum impact both in terms of development and foreign policy. 
 
China’s foreign assistance programming continues to be dispersed across a number of 
government units, although the Ministry of Commerce is, in principle, responsible for managing 
China’s assistance to foreign countries. With respect to China’s support for research for 
development, the main administrative units continue to be the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). 
 
This report also draws attention to several new trends in Chinese development assistance: 
 
• China has increased its assistance to projects that build institutional capacity and develop 
human resources. This shift may open doors to new partnership opportunities between 
China and international donors in providing assistance in research for development to 
developing countries. 
• China is devoting greater support for projects based in Africa. In terms of regional 
disbursements, Africa is slated for the largest increases in Chinese foreign assistance 
over the next five years. 
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• Building on the country’s experience in regional multilateral development cooperation in 
the Greater Mekong Sub-region and the Central Asian Region third, China is 
experimenting with new multi-donor development assistance partnerships via initiatives 
led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
• Chinese authorities are currently exploring new opportunities for international partnership 
in policy research and research for development around new multi-donor-supported 
south-south dialogue in Beijing. 
 
On a more cautionary note, this report draws attention to the limitations in China’s recent 
exploratory steps in donor coordination, and the constraints that may be inherent in the new 
institutional partnerships that are currently being supported by the major donors in Beijing. 
 
This report consists of seven sections. The first section discusses the historical development of 
China’s development-assistance programming since the mid-1950s and its guiding principles. 
The second outlines the basic decision-making and administrative structure of China’s 
development-assistance programming. The third section highlights the key agencies, policy 
guidelines, and program elements related to China’s support for international research for 
development, while the fourth draws on the most complete information available in the public 
domain and interviews with Chinese officials, to describe the patterns of China’s development 
assistance programming and disbursement. The fifth section describes the main components and 
disbursement patterns in China’s foreign assistance programming in research for development. 
Finally, the sixth and seventh sections analyze linkages and partnerships between China and 




1. A Tradition of Development Assistance 
 
Chinese aid to developing countries started in the mid-1950s, increased in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and decreased in the 1980s when the country became both a recipient of development 
assistance and a donor. The label of emerging donor, therefore, is misleading in the case of 
China. 
 
During most of the Maoist period (1949-1976), China’s development assistance was managed by 
the Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries (now the Department of Aid to 
Foreign Countries within the Ministry of Commerce) and was guided by the “Eight Principles for 
China’s Aid to Third World Countries”: 
 
1. Emphasize equality and mutual benefit 
2. Respect sovereignty and never attach conditions 
3. Provide interest-free or low-interest loans 
4. Help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance 
5. Build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly 
6. Provide quality equipment and material at market prices 
7. Ensure effective technical assistance 




Chinese foreign aid during the Maoist period can best be understood as operating at three levels: 
 
First, China’s development assistance was designed to help post-colonial regimes modernize and 
become self-reliant, and focused on agricultural aid, technical assistance, and projects that could 
be completed quickly. The central aim of this assistance was to help developing countries feed 
and clothe their people. Loans to support local projects were usually provided interest-free. The 
Chinese referred—and continue to refer—to their development assistance as “poor helping the 
poor”. 
 
A second level was China’s desire to help advance communist internationalism and, later, the 
non-aligned position in the developing world. At the height of their assistance, the Chinese even 
sought to take a leadership role in the Third World anti-imperialist struggle and the international 
Communist movement by exporting the Maoist model of peasant-based socialist construction and 
offsetting Soviet influence. 
 
And third, China used development assistance to mitigate the influence of Taiwan’s Kuomintang 
government and counter its diplomatic efforts to maintain international recognition as the 
government of China. 
 
The main debates over Chinese development assistance policy took place in the early 1970s. 
During this time, the goal of Chinese development assistance shifted from advancing international 
Communism and the Maoist model of peasant-based social construction to ensuring regime 
survival in China and aligning international assistance with national interests. In effect, Chinese 
leaders debated how the country could pursue rational developmental goals and still be a 
socialist state and a supporter of Third World interests. During this period, China also became 
interested in competing with other nations for natural resources in the developing world. As a 
result of these debates, by the mid-1980s, Chinese authorities shifted official policy toward 
development assistance projects that provided economic benefits both to China and recipient 
countries. 
 
                                                 
1 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai announced the Eight Principles in January 1964 during a speech in Mali. 
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The early years of Chinese international development assistance were influenced by Soviet 
thinking and communist/proletarian internationalism. As tensions with the Soviet Union grew in 
the late 1950s and China shifted to an increased interest in playing a leadership role in the non-
aligned movement, the country increased its sponsorships of large-scale aid projects. In many 
projects, China handled all aspects of development, including sending construction workers. 
During this time, China took on its largest aid project ever—the 1,200-mile Tanzania-Zambia 
Railroad. Chinese development assistance also went into building large but less developmentally 
crucial structures such as sports stadiums, which were requested by African leaders. 
 
In terms of policy continuity, through the entire Maoist period, the Chinese tended to be strategic 
about opportunity costs and attempted to focus the country’s scarce resources where they could 
have maximum impact. By the 1960s, these calculations were driven by a desire to contrast 
China’s behaviour from that of other foreign donors, especially the Soviet Union and the United 
States. 
 
Although Chinese development assistance programming has evolved over the years, Chinese 
government officials interviewed for this study maintain that the Eight Principles first espoused in 
1964 have continued to inform Chinese aid programming. Continuity with the Eight Principles can 
be seen in the principles that guide today’s development assistance programming. According to 
these principles, development assistance should: 
 
• promote international friendship, peaceful relations, and international cooperation; 
• be based on, and support, relations of equality, and respect demands of partner 
countries; 
• be based on mutual support in national and international affairs; 
• offer assistance within China’s capacity; 
• be based on mutual respect; and 
• result in win-win cooperation, and in doing so, China contributes to building the 
international community. 
 
The Chinese government has not published a formal foreign aid or development assistance 
policy. Instead, China’s history as a recipient of foreign assistance has influenced its development 
assistance programs and reinforced a belief in the continuing relevance of the country’s 
guidelines for foreign assistance. 
 
For instance, Chinese officials have amassed a series of lessons based on what they consider 
the poor behaviour of traditional donors. These lessons are presented as actions that run counter 
to the Eight Principles. 
 
On the other hand, positive lessons have emerged on the importance of capacity building 
programs to sustainable development. These lessons have influenced China in increasing its 
support in this area. 
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2. The Four Administrative Pillars of Chinese Development Assistance 
 
There is no stand-alone government unit responsible for China’s development assistance 
programming. China’s development assistance programming is scattered across a number of 
government units and operates under leadership of China’s ruling Communist Party. Two high-
level political bodies provide direction to the four organizations that administer foreign aid. 
 
Atop the core structure that manages development assistance in China is the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) Leading Grouping for Foreign Affairs, chaired by CPP General Secretary 
and State President Hu Jintao. This group provides general policy direction and guidance to 
government organizations involved in development assistance. Beneath the Leading Grouping for 
Foreign Affairs is the State Council Leading Group for Foreign Affairs, chaired by Premier Wen 
Jiabao. This group regulates China’s aid programming but is not involved in daily operations. 
 
Four organizations manage the grant portion of China’s development assistance programming: 
 
• Ministry of Commerce, Department of Aid to Foreign Countries; 
• the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); 
• select line ministries, including MOST, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the Ministry of 
Education (MOE), the Ministry of Health (MOH), and the Ministry of Communications 
(MOC); and 
• the International Liaison Office of the CCP Central Committee. 
 
These organizations report to the State Council Leading Group for Foreign Affairs via an inter-
ministerial coordination group for foreign aid.  See Figure 1 below. 
 
Ministry of Commerce, Department of Aid to Foreign Countries 
As the main agency for managing China’s foreign aid programs, the Ministry of Commerce 
conducts initial feasibility analysis for proposed aid projects, coordinates the process of identifying 
Chinese implementing agencies, and conducts project reviews. MOFCOM is primarily responsible 





Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The exact mandate and role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the provision of China’s foreign 
aid is not clear. The MFA apparently strives to ensure that foreign aid programming conforms with 
Chinese foreign policy by advising MOFCOM. In practice, it seems that China’s foreign aid 
policies differ in terms of objectives and priorities in relation to respective world regions and in 
response to the government’s Africa policy, Asia policy, and Latin and Central American policy. 
Foreign policy is preconditioned by the CPP’s grand strategy for foreign affairs. 
 
The MFA, however, does appear to play a strong role in negotiating and managing the delivery of 
China’s emergency humanitarian assistance, although MOFCOM takes over most responsibilities 
for aid delivery once agreements are in place. Evidence suggests that officials in the Department 






                                                 
2 The China Import Export Bank’s Department of Concessional Loans manages the state’s concessional financing loans 
related to China’s international economic cooperation. The China Development Bank, one of China’s four main policy 
banks, has also taken an interest in helping Chinese enterprises invest in developing countries. Chinese officials from the 
Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were far more willing to discuss the grant portion of Chinese aid 
and less willing to discuss China’s development assistance lending. 
3 Interview with director of the Ministry of Finance’s Department for Policy Planning, April 17, 2007. 
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Select line ministries 
MOFCOM recruits sector-specific line ministries (the ministries of science and technology, 
agriculture, education, health, and communications) as needed to deliver development 
assistance. These line ministries also receive requests for foreign assistance from their 
counterpart agencies in developing countries, and forward these requests to the formal review 
process in Beijing. As such, these ministries take on a lobbying function inside the structure of 
Chinese foreign aid programming in addition to playing their role in the delivery of assistance 
implementation. 
 
International Liaison Office of the CCP Central Committee 
The main role of this office is to ensure that the CCP maintains diplomatic channels with 
established and non-hostile political parties around the world. In terms of development 
assistance, the office gives the CCP a mechanism to monitor, oversee, and steer foreign 
assistance projects to ensure that they conform to CCP diplomatic objectives. 
 























• The Ministry of Finance (MOF) sets foreign aid budgets and appropriates funds.
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• Government-affiliated service organizations such as the International Cooperation Centre 
provide training programs and workshops to foreign officials and researchers on China’s 




• The National Development Reform Commission reviews large-scale economic 




• The Ministry of National Defense (MND), specifically its Foreign Affairs Office, 
coordinates the foreign aid work of China’s armed forces—the People’s Liberation Army. 
The MND also takes on specific tasks, agreed to with MOFCOM, in areas of international 
humanitarian assistance. A recent case was its contributions in the post-tsunami relief 
effort. 
 
Executive responsibility lies with Chinese premier 
The Chinese premier is responsible for administering foreign aid programming. Authority for 
China’s foreign aid policy and programming, however, lies at the top of the political hierarchy with 
the CCP General Secretary and China’s State President. Direct responsibility for oversight of 
foreign aid is delegated to a vice-premier. 
 
Within MOFCOM, Wei Jianguo is the vice-minister responsible for China’s foreign aid 
programming and is the official to whom the Department for Aid to Foreign Countries reports.
7
 A 
vice-minister has also been assigned responsibility for development assistance within the line 
ministries involved in managing China’s development assistance. 
 
Main characteristics of financing process 
No Chinese officials were willing to discuss how the country finances development assistance in 
detail, but they did describe the financing process as having the following characteristics: 
 
• Officials decide which projects to fund, and the required funding is allocated from the 
national budget. 
• MOFCOM administers 90 percent of all grant aid, while MOST controls 10 percent. 
• The EXIM Bank—and more recently, the China Development Bank (CDB)—extends 
concessional loans to foreign and Chinese partners involved in economic cooperation 
initiatives. 
 
MOST finances research for development projects undertaken by developing countries either out 
of the department’s share of the foreign aid budget or from its overall operational budget.
8
 As for 
the CAS, it funds research for development projects mainly out of the organization’s annual 
budget.
9
 Moreover, CAS officials noted that MOFCOM will occasionally ask the CAS to undertake 
scientific research-related projects, and that these projects are usually funded by MOFCOM. The 
International Cooperation Bureau of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS/ICB) facilitates 
delivery of these projects. 
 
                                                 
4 These actions are usually done on an annual basis and in consultation with the main ministries responsible for foreign 
aid; some actors attempt to lobby the ministries for additional funds. 
5 These quasi-governmental organizations have greater flexibility to work with donors and other sponsoring agencies on 
international programs. The International Cooperation Centre has an established track record of working with international 
donors on innovative development projects, starting from its incarnation in the early 1990s as the Foreign Affairs Office of 
the Special Economic Zones Office. In the late 1990s, the organization was known as the Foreign Affairs Office of China’s 
State Commission Office for Restructuring the Economic System. 
6 National Development and Reform Commission reviews project proposals sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
Commission then sends them, with comments, to the International Economic Cooperation Office, a special international 
economic coordination office inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
7 Listed on the Ministry of Commerce website. 
8 Interview with the director of the Ministry of Science and Technology’s International Cooperation Bureau, April 18, 2007. 
9 Interview with officials from the Chinese Academy of Sciences Bureau of International Cooperation, April 16, 2007. 
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3. Support for Research for Development 
 
China’s development assistance for research for development conforms to the same set of 
guidelines that govern its foreign assistance. According to the statement prepared by the Ministry 
of Finance’s Department of Policy Planning on south-south cooperation: 
 
China is ready to conduct extensive and in-depth cooperation with the countries of the 
South in the areas of economy, science and technology, education, and culture on the 
basis of the principles of equality and mutual benefit, stressing practical results, diversity 
in forms, and common development. China is ready to provide assistance to some 
developing countries having difficulties within its capabilities. Though China's assistance 




Other government departments and agencies have issued similar statements on China’s 
cooperation with developing countries. In terms of development assistance in research for 
development, the Ministry of Science and Technology is guided by its policy positioning on south-
south cooperation, as articulated by the MOST director general of international cooperation, who 
stated: 
 
Since its implementation of “reform and opening” policy, China has witnessed fast growth 
of its economic and S&T activities, turning out numerous technologies applicable to the 
needs of developing nations and attracting their attention. I’m confident that the diffusions 
and applications of these Chinese proven technologies in developing nations will benefit 
the economic development of recipients and the improvement of their technological 
levels. The Chinese Government has always paid great attention to S&T exchanges and 




The primary agencies and institutions involved in research for development are: 
 
Ministry of Science and Technology: 
MOST is the government ministry responsible for providing and managing China’s development 
assistance in science and technology research cooperation with developing countries. MOST’s 
Bureau for International Cooperation promotes and manages China’s cooperation in science and 
technology research, drawing on MOST’s operational budget. It also collaborates with other line 
ministries and research institutes as required. 
 
Chinese Academy of Sciences: 
CAS research cooperation concentrates on research projects related to agriculture, geology, the 
environment, natural resources, and ecological systems. More recently, there has been a 
stronger emphasis on capacity building, specifically the capacity of scientific researchers. To 
carry out capacity building, the CAS provides specialized training to professional scientists and 
leaders of scientific institutions. This shift in development assistance mirrors MOFCOM’s 
emphasis on capacity building. CAS units most involved in research for development cooperation 
are the International Cooperation Bureau and the Division of International Organization 
Programs. 
 
Ministry of Education: 
The MOE manages China’s large-scale academic research grants. The department also works 
with MOFCOM to identify experts to participate in scientific research for development. 
 
Natural Science Foundation China, Chinese Academy of Engineers and China Association for 
Science and Technology: 
                                                 
10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/zcyjs/xgxw/t24932.htm). 
11 Source: Ministry of Science and Technology website. 
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The NSFC and the CAE are core institutions in China’s science and technology policy network, 
and are involved in south-south cooperation. The programming of these two institutions is not 
organized in terms of development assistance or development cooperation, and they have yet to 
receive a clear signal from the CCP and government leaders to add development assistance to 
their core agendas. As such, no funds have been allocated to these institutions for development 
assistance activities. 
 
These organizations cooperate with scientific foundations and associations in countries 
throughout Asia and Central America. In fact, the NSFC has formalized relations with natural 
science foundations in Vietnam, India, Russia, Thailand, and Mexico, while the CAE has 
formalized relations with its counterparts in India and Russia
12
 and sent delegations to 
international conferences in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam in 2006. Recently, the 
CAE also established an African Relations Division in its International Cooperation Bureau. The 
work of this organization, however, is just beginning; the main regional priority for the CAE 
remains Asia. 
 
Another institution worth mentioning is the China Association for Science and Technology, which 
plays a role in China’s science and technology policy, and participates in international policy 
conferences and seminars. 
 
China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong: 
CELAP is a national research institute for comparative development that hosts visiting 
researchers from developing countries and countries in transition to examine different paths to 
develop market economies and integrate into the international economy. The purpose of such 
research is to foster more nuanced development policy options and to improve understanding of 
the strengths and limits of the Chinese model, including the conditions under which China’s 
experience is applicable. CELAP research also informs national policy thinking and Chinese 
development assistance. 
 
                                                 
12 Interviews with directors of the International Cooperation Bureaus of the Chinese Academy of Engineers and the 
National Natural Science Foundation China, April 17 and 19, 2007. 
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4. Development Assistance Programming and Disbursement Patterns 
 
Data available on Chinese development assistance are insufficient to accurately determine the 
amount of Chinese grant and loan aid or the precise breakdown of this aid in terms of recipients 
and sector concentrations. What is known is that the official data fall far short of the pledges 
mentioned in press reports from both inside and outside China. 
 
Public sources such as press reports describe many projects that receive Chinese assistance 
and report aggregate totals for Chinese bilateral assistance. Chinese press reports, however, 
tend to lack details on the nature and form of Chinese assistance. In particular, the reports do not 





Tracking the volume of Chinese aid in aggregate, or broken down by geographical and sector 
disbursements, is further inhibited by the fact that China does not follow rules set down by the 
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Development and Co-
operation, whose members count and report aid levels according to Official Development 
Assistance classifications. Data provided in this report are the most recent tabulations that have 
been carried out and published for public access by Chinese sources and international analysts. 
 
Disbursement amounts over time 
MOFCOM officials were unwilling to provide aggregate disbursement amounts over time.
14
 The 
officials also note that China lacks a unified administrative structure to manage its foreign 
assistance, making it difficult to calculate how much funding each line ministry contributes to 
development assistance. Ministries are prohibited from sharing these data with foreigners.
15
 In 
fact, information on Chinese foreign aid is considered a state secret. In recent years, though, 
Chinese officials have become increasingly willing to discuss these matters with foreign analysts 
and stakeholders, and China now publishes figures for a portion of its spending on development 
assistance. 
 
As a significant recipient of international assistance, Chinese officials have downplayed the 
country’s role as a donor of development assistance. The most complete aggregate data on 
Chinese donor assistance is US$602.77 million for 2002, US$630.36 million for 2003, and 




These figures likely do not include loans for development assistance, although the Chinese 
government also provides development assistance in concessional loans. These are mainly loans 
for industrial and infrastructure projects, and are usually financed through the EXIM Bank. Tied 
financing requires that most financing be used to buy Chinese materials and labour for the 
project. The EXIM Bank’s annual report does not provide a breakdown of financing that identifies 




In fact, China’s development assistance totals increase substantially when loans are included. 
The EXIM Bank reportedly received US$5 billion in July 2005 from China’s State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange to finance its policy lending operations. Speculation among Western and 
Chinese analysts is that the EXIM Bank’s operations, including its lending for development 
assistance, will expand significantly over the next five years—in part to fulfil pledges from China’s 
                                                 
13 News reports from recipient countries often provide greater detail on Chinese assistance projects. 
14 Interview with official of the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, April 16, 2007. 
15 Interview with China Institute for Contemporary International Relations researchers, April 18, 2007. 
16 Derived from entries in “Main items of budgetary expenditure of central and local governments” table, China Statistical 
Yearbook, 2003-2005 editions. Converted to $US at rate of 8.3 yuan to one dollar. 
17 The Export and Import Bank of China Annual Report can be viewed on the bank’s website. 
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Analysis of public sources suggests that Chinese grant and loan development assistance in 2004 
totalled approximately US$10 billion. As such, there appears to be a huge discrepancy between 
international estimates and official Chinese figures for foreign assistance. The discrepancy can 
be accounted for, in part, by the lack of clarity on where Chinese development assistance ends 
and where commercial cooperation begins. Furthermore, the difference between the modest 
figures for development assistance that have been reported and the multibillion-dollar 
commitments made by Chinese leaders indicates that the official figures for development 
assistance are underreported and that unreported channels are likely used to approve and 
convey development assistance. The only fact that can be stated with certainty is that the total 




Sector and geographical distribution of disbursements and types of projects 
In interviews, Chinese officials were unwilling to provide details on sectoral distribution of 
disbursements. Statements, however, indicate that a large percentage of Chinese support goes 
to infrastructure and energy facilities such as railroads, power plants, and power lines, and that 
numerous large grants and loans go to oil-producing states such as Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria. 
Comments from Chinese officials also indicate that significant resources have been channelled 
into sports stadiums, while other projects include debt relief and financing to purchase Chinese 
goods. 
 
More recently, assistance has also been directed toward manufacturing projects that generate 
income and employment, promoting health and social development, human resource 
development, and management training. In fact, substantial development assistance has been 
directed to the medical and health-care sectors; assistance in basic medial care has had a great 
impact in Africa. 
 
Chinese officials were also unwilling to discuss the geographical specifics of disbursements. 
According to a comprehensive data-collection program, which combined public sources and 
official Chinese data, China’s current disbursement pattern for foreign assistance is 40 percent for 
Asia, 25 percent for Africa, 13 percent for Latin and Central America, and 10 percent for other 
countries. 
 
Of note, China provided more than US$5 billion in assistance to Thailand and Indonesia through 
the International Monetary Fund in 1998 during the Asian financial crisis. Public reports indicate 
that Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea were the largest beneficiaries of Chinese development 
assistance in 2004. Chinese assistance to Pakistan reportedly increased dramatically in 2003-
2004, with press reports citing more than US$6.8 billion for projects such as a nuclear reactor, 
power plants, railroad improvements, and for general development. 
 
China’s assistance to Africa is slated for major increases in the immediate future. Chinese 
President Hu Jintao stated that China would take five specific steps between 2005 and 2008 to 
increase its assistance to the developing world: 
 
1. Accord zero tariff treatment to a number of products from all 39 least-developed countries 
having diplomatic relations with China. 
2. Further expand aid programs to heavily indebted poor countries and least-developed 
countries, and forgive overdue loans. 
                                                 
18 Interviews with Western and Chinese analysts, including officials of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s Development and Co-operation Co-ordination Group, February through April 2006. 
19 This point was verified in interviews with officials of the ministries of Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Science and 
Technology, and China Institute for Contemporary International Relations researchers, April 2007. 
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3. Provide $10 billion in concessional loans and preferential export buyer’s credit to 
developing countries to improve infrastructure and promote cooperation. 
4. Increase assistance to developing countries, especially African countries, by providing 
anti-malarial drugs and other medicines, and helping establish and improve medical 
facilities and train staff. 
5. Help train 30,000 personnel of various professions from developing countries within the 
next three years. 
 
At the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006, President Hu Jintao pledged that 
China would double its aid to Africa from its 2006 level by 2009.
20
 In particular, China would: 
 
• Offer US$3 billion in preferential loans and US$2 billion in export credits over the next 
three years. 
• More than double the number of goods that will not be taxed when exported from Africa 
to China. 
• Train 15,000 African professionals. 
• Establish a development fund to help build schools and hospitals. 
 
By 2007, the total value of Chinese loans and grants to African countries has already reached 
nearly US$3 billion. It is difficult, however, to predict whether or not China’s current focus on 
Africa will be maintained into the future. In fact, Asian officials have already started to woo 
Chinese authorities to increase assistance to their home region after bearing witness to China’s 
massive new pledges to Africa. 
 
Furthermore, development assistance in Latin and Central America, and the Caribbean has 
concentrated on infrastructure, energy and natural resources development. It is being used to 
counter a political trend toward recognizing Taiwan diplomatically.
21
 Of the 24 countries in the 
world that recognize Taiwan, half are located in this region. 
 
Types of institutions supported and tying 
Chinese officials were unwilling to provide details regarding disbursement channels for Chinese 
aid. Comments from Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Science and Technology officials, 
however, indicate that the overwhelming majority of China’s aid disbursements are made 
bilaterally. 
 
China, however, has some experience disbursing through multilateral channels, although the 
amounts have been rather limited. The Chinese definition of foreign assistance is much broader 
than conventional Western definitions. In China, foreign assistance encompasses not only grants 
and loans, but also commercial investments, trade-related concessional financing, and 
educational and cultural exchange programs. This broad definition means that the Chinese 
government may be able to disburse a significant amount of development assistance funds 





In terms of bilateral assistance, China supports foreign government institutions, public-welfare 
institutions, research institutes, commercial and business enterprises, and educational and 
culture institutions. Chinese multilateral assistance tends to go to projects run and supported by 
the United Nations, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
 
                                                 
20 “China has pledged to double its aid to Africa and provide $5 bn in loans and credits over the next three 
years”, BBC News, November 4, 2006. 
21 This point was highlighted by a China Institute for Contemporary International Relations researcher, 
April 18, 2007. 
22 The specifics of the Chinese contribution are currently under discussion. 
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All bilateral assistance is tied aid. This tied aid includes research and development assistance 
grants, technical assistance, and loans. Chinese aid is delivered by Chinese implementing 
agencies, which call on a range of Chinese experts and groups, including scientists, 
professionals, technical experts, corporations, government representatives, and quasi-
governmental intermediary organizations. 
 
Chinese aid officials did not identify specific program priorities. Instead, they indicated that the 
previous focus of Chinese foreign assistance—infrastructure, energy facilities, and sports 
stadiums—has been complemented with a greater focus on capacity building and social 
development. Chinese officials also noted that development assistance responds to requests 
from recipient countries. 
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5. Research for Development Programming and Disbursement Patterns 
 
Chinese officials were unwilling to provide details on disbursements for research for development. 
Chinese Academy of Sciences officials, however, note that the organization’s involvement in 
development assistance has increased since the China-Africa Forum in November 2006. MOST 
officials indicate that, for 2006, the department provided research exchange opportunities for 
approximately 200 scientific research teams in activities ranging from collaborative research to 
workshops and seminars. MOST officials also stated that the department and MOFCOM fund 
Chinese scientists and managerial personnel of research institutes who travel to developing 
countries to provide technical assistance and engage in research exchanges and scientific 
seminars, workshops, and conferences. To fund these activities, MOST draws on its 10-percent 
share of the country’s development assistance funds. 
 
A conservative estimate of MOST’s aggregate funding for research for development, paid for out 
of its own operational budget, is US$61 million for 2002, US$63 million for 2003, and US$73 
million for 2004. MOST officials note that the department draws from other parts of its budget to 
cover additional science and technology research activities not included in the department’s 
regular development assistance programming. 
 
CAS officials noted that the organization usually draws on its normal operating budget to fund 
research projects with developing countries. The organization also receives funding from 
MOFCOM for certain research projects. In addition, the CAS relies on the scientists in the two 
countries to raise the funds necessary for their research cooperation. 
 
MOST’s priority topics for science and technology research and development are energy, 
environment, health, water, and education. These priorities also extend to the department’s 
cooperation activities with developing countries. 
 
The CAS assists MOFCOM in helping developing countries build their capacities in scientific 
research and professional managerial skills for scientific institutions. It focuses on agriculture, 
geology, environment, natural resources management, and ecological systems. 
 
Since 2006, however, CAS research for development has increasingly focused on helping 
personnel in developing countries build capacity to undertake research through scientific 
cooperation in technology transfer, basic science, and high-technology cooperation, including 
biotechnology. In 2007, the CAS established seven courses for some 1,000 African scientists and 
scientific experts. In fact, since the China-Africa Forum in 2006, the amount of research for 
development to Africa has increased substantially. 
 
Although China appears to prefer bilateral cooperation, the country’s scientists also participate in 
multilateral initiatives. For instance, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region is the demonstration 
site for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations-China agriculture park, and China has 
supported research for development cooperation in two regional multilateral programs supported 
by the Asian Development Bank: the Great Mekong Sub-region (GMS) program and the Central 
Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program. 
 
The CAS provides direct bilateral development assistance to scientific research institutes and to 
government offices of developing countries that support scientific research. The CAS also 
sponsors international academic conferences and enables Chinese scientists to participate in 
multilateral activities sponsored by international organizations. The CAS also cooperates with 
international organizations such as the Academy of Sciences for the Developing Countries 
(formerly called the Third World Academy of Sciences), the InterAcademy Council (IAC), and the 
InterAcademy Panel (IAP). Recently, the CAS contributed US$50,000 to the IAP. 
 
 16 
MOST and CAS officials claim that all research exchanges sponsored by their departments are 
organized at the request of recipient countries.
23
 China does not force other countries to take on 
research projects with China or pressure other developing countries to accept Chinese manner or 
modes. 
 
In terms of research exchanges hosted by China, Ministry of Finance regulations state that MOST 
cannot pay the costs of teams visiting China. This restriction prevents many scientific researchers 
from taking part in MOST research for development programs.  
 
                                                 
23 Interview with official from the Ministry of Science and Technology, April 19, 2007. 
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6. Increasing International Linkages for Development Assistance 
 
There are no SWAP-type donor groupings in China.
24
 Donor groupings and donor coordination in 
general has been discouraged by the Chinese government, which prefers to direct donors’ 
involvement in development assistance projects in China. Despite the country’s reservations 
about donor coordination, China is involved—as a recipient and donor—in two development 
programs facilitated and supported by the Asian Development Bank: the GMS program and the 
CAREC program. 
 
Started in 1992, the GMS program promotes development via economic linkages and regional 
cooperation.
25
 It promotes economic and social development in the six Mekong countries: 
Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. China participates in the program 





The CAREC program promotes and facilitates trade and cooperation in the transportation and 
energy sectors, and in other key development areas among Central Asian and neighbouring 
countries, including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China (focusing on Xinjiang Autonomous Region), 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
27
 Started in 1997, the 
CAREC program is also an alliance of multilateral and other international agencies active in 
promoting economic cooperation in Central Asia, such as the Asian Development Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Islamic Development Bank, the UNDP, and the World Bank. The Chinese government 
contributed US$500,000 to this initiative in 2006.
28
 MOFCOM’s Department for International 
Trade and Economic Affairs manages China’s activities under the program. 
 
One of the main reasons why China takes part in these programs is to facilitate coordinated 
development in regional infrastructure and logistics integration. For China, the CAREC program 
also provides an institutional mechanism that fosters a coordinated regional approach to energy 
development. In addition, the two programs encourage efficient economic flows within their 
respective regions, in which China has certain comparative advantages, and produce secondary 
benefits such as poverty reduction, social development, and environmental and natural resource 
management. 
 
Two other notable donor-coordinated initiatives are the International Poverty Reduction Centre in 
China (IPRCC) and the China-Africa Business Council (CABC). Launched in 2006, the IPRCC is 
an international agency initiated and established by the Chinese government, the UNDP, and 
other international organizations. Devoted to training, exchanges, and research related to poverty 
reduction, the IPRCC is in the inception stage and relies on support from the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, and two bilateral development agencies—the Department for 
International Development (United Kingdom) and the GTZ (Germany). The Department for 
International Development is leading their coordinated efforts to establish a program of “South-




                                                 
24 SWAP is the acronym for Sector-Wide Approach Programs, which pool the contributions of the major donors, and are 
developed in consultation with government representatives of the recipient country. 
25 Information from Asian Development Bank report, “Mekong Leaders: Building Capacity in the GMS Countries”, June 
2006. 
26 Information from Asian Development Bank report, “The People’s Republic of China in the Greater Mekong Sub-region” 
2007. 
27 Information from Asian Development Bank report, “Comprehensive Action Plan: CAREC”, 2007. 
28 Interview with the Asian Development Bank official responsible for CAREC, April 24, 2007. 
29 International Poverty Reduction Centre in China, Annual Report 2006. 
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The UNDP has also taken the lead in working with the Chinese government to establish the 
CABC.
30
 This multilateral initiative, with its clear link between commercial development and 
development assistance, reflects China’s current approach to development cooperation. 
Launched in 2006, it coordinates feedback from African participants and input from the Asian 
Development Bank and Chinese businesses and sector associations. 
 
Although China partners on development assistance projects primarily to provide expertise, 
financing, and information, political motivations such as the political preferences of recipient 
countries and pressure from international donors are becoming increasingly apparent in Chinese 
decisions. In 2003, several donors took notice of China’s increased lending and development 
assistance and began lobbying the country to coordinate its efforts with the donor community. 
 
As a result, China’s aid programming appears to be evolving. In fact, the country’s favourable 
experiences with ADB and UNDP partnerships appear to be encouraging Chinese authorities to 
experiment further with the IPRCC and international coordination of development assistance. 
These developments open the possibility for China to engage in further multilateral arrangements 
and may constitute a new trend in China’s development assistance programming. 
 
                                                 
30 Interview with United Nations Development Programme representative, April 23, 2007. 
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7. International Linkages for Research for Development 
 
To date, China has formed no major donor groupings for research for development except the 
loose network of donors that has emerged to support the IPRCC. In fact, the IPRCC is the only 
major donor-to-donor linkage in research for development that involves China. Discussions are 
underway to establish the applied research operation for the IPRCC, which would focus on 
research cooperation for poverty alleviation. 
 
The country’s motivation for allowing a donor group to emerge in this case has much to do with 
the financial support offered by the international donor organizations, which are promoting the 
IPRCC as a test case to launch a new phase of donor coordination with China. The donors have 
agreed to provide the majority of IPRCC financing for the first three years of operation, after 
which the organization is expected to be self-sustaining. 
 
Political considerations also appear to be motivating the Chinese government. The State 
Council’s Leading Group Office for Poverty Alleviation (LGOPA), which is the lead Chinese 
agency for this initiative, enjoys a proven track record of successfully managing cooperation 
projects in sensitive areas such as poverty and social inequities. After extended deliberations and 
considerable encouragement, the LGOPA agreed to build a China-focused poverty-reduction 
research centre, which will enable foreign groups to use the Chinese experience to draw lessons 




In developing countries, China also creates collaborative research partnerships with local 
scientists that involve management training and research exchange agreements with local 
research centres and policy think tanks. MOST has a substantial research cooperation program 
that covers activities in energy, environment, health, water, and education. The CAS coordinates 
research for development through its CAS-Third World Academy of Sciences Fellowship 
Research Program for postgraduate, postdoctoral, and senior scientific researchers.
32
 TWAS is 
an autonomous international organization founded in Trieste, Italy in 1983.
33
 The program, which 
has run since 2000, pays for 50 accomplished researchers from developing countries to spend a 
year working at a CAS institute in China. 
 
                                                 
31 Interview with Department for International Development (United Kingdom) official, April 23, 2007. 
32 The former Chinese Academy of Sciences president was the Third World Academy of Sciences vice-president; a 
current Chinese Academy of Sciences vice-president is a senior leader of the Third World Academy of Sciences. 
Interview with official from the Chinese Academy of Sciences Bureau of International Cooperation, April 16, 2007. 
33 Since 1986, the Third World Academy of Sciences has supported scientific research and capacity building projects in 




Data available on Chinese development assistance are insufficient to accurately determine the 
amount of Chinese grant and loan aid or the precise breakdown of this aid in terms of recipients 
and sector concentrations. The total amount of Chinese aid has increased significantly in the last 
three years, and will likely increase further in the future, barring an unforeseen major downturn in 
China’s economic situation. 
   
In examining the various dimensions of China’s development assistance programs, including 
research for development, it appears that China’s apparent reluctance to coordinate development 
assistance programming with the “traditional donors” is diminishing, in particular as regards 
multilateral donors. In fact, the country’s favourable experiences with ADB and UNDP 
partnerships appear to be encouraging Chinese authorities to experiment further with the IPRCC 
and international coordination of development assistance. These developments open the 
possibility for China to engage in further multilateral arrangements and may constitute a new 
trend in China’s development assistance programming. Chinese authorities appear to be keeping 
the IPRRC under close scrutiny, and will likely draw lessons from this experience to inform further 
multi-donor collaborative efforts. 
 
Specific program priorities were not identified. However, it was indicated that the previous focus 
of Chinese foreign assistance—infrastructure, energy facilities, and sports stadiums—is being 
complemented by a greater focus on capacity building and social development. Chinese officials 
also noted that development assistance responds to requests from recipient countries. It would 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
ADB – Asian Development Bank 
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CAAP – Chinese Academy of Agricultural Policy 
CABC – China-African Business Council 
CAE – Chinese Academy of Engineers 
CAREC Program – Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation Program  
CAS – Chinese Academy of Sciences 
CAS/ICB – International Cooperation Bureau of the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
CASS – Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
CCP – Chinese Communist Party 
CDB – China Development Bank 
CELAP – China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong (Shanghai) 
CICIR – China Institute for Contemporary International Relations   
DfID – Department for International Development (United Kingdom) 
DAFC – Department of Aid to Foreign Countries in the Ministry of Commerce 
DITEA – Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Commerce 
EXIM Bank – Export & Import Bank of China 
GMS Program – Greater Mekong Subregion Program 
IAC – InterAcademy Council 
IAP – InterAcademy Panel 
ICC – International Cooperation Center affiliated to the National Development and Reform 
Commission 
IPRCC – International Poverty Reduction Centre in China 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
LGOPA – Leading Group Office for Poverty Alleviation of the State Council 
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MOA – Ministry of Agriculture 
MOC – Ministry of Communications 
MOE – Ministry of Education 
MOF – Ministry of Finance 
MOFCOM – Ministry of Commerce 
MOH – Ministry of Health 
MOST – Ministry of Science and Technology 
MND – Ministry of National Defense  
NDRC – National Development and Reform Commission 
NGO – Non-governmental organization 
NSFC – National Natural Science Foundation China  
ODA – Official Development Assistance 
OECD – Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OECD/DAC – Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic 
Development and Cooperation 
Party LG – Chinese Communist Party Leading Group 
PLA – People’s Liberation Army 
RMB – Renminbi (Chinese currency) 
SCOPSR – State Council Office for Public Sector Reform 
SIDA – Swedish International Development Agency 
SWAP – Sector-wide approach 
TWAS – Third World Academy of Sciences 
UNDP – United Nations Development Program 
UNIDO – United Nations Industrial Development Organization  
USAID – United States Agency for International Development 
WB – The World Bank 
 
